



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 21

## Italian Voters Want Change

by Jane Perry Clark Carey

ROME—The grey skies and outbursts of heavy rain throughout Italy on June 7 and 8 turned out to be bad omens for the center coalition. As the result of the elections held on the two days, this group, composed of Christian Democrats (CD), Social Democrats (PSDI), Liberals (PLI) and Republicans (PRI), lost ground, despite the enormous vote in which 28,386,610, or 93.78 percent of the electorate, registered their choices among about 8,000 candidates of at least 18 parties for 590 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 237 in the Senate.

The deep political interest was due not so much to the youth and enthusiasm of the Italian Republic or to the voters' sense of civic obligation as to the deep-seated differences between the parties of the center and those of the left and right extremes and to the realization that the battle was unusually close.

The importance of the election lay in the decision as to how far the middle-of-the-road, pro-American and pro-European-union government of Premier Alcide De Gasperi, with its slow-moving program of social reform, would be vindicated or how far the anti-American, strongly nationalist Monarchist

and neo-Fascist parties on the right and the Communists and left-wing Socialists on the left had captured the Italian people.

The answer of the voters to these questions indicated discontent with existing conditions and a desire for change. Poverty, unemployment, lack of credit, slow progress in land reform all combined to push the Italian people toward the more extreme parties.

Realizing that their control had slipped during the five years since the last parliamentary elections of 1948, the center had based their hopes on a new electoral law which would have given their coalition 64.5 percent of the seats in the Chamber if they had won 50.01 percent of the votes. Yet so close was the race that this "majority premium" was lost by the tiny margin of 57,000 votes, or less than 1 percent. As there are 1.3 million contested votes, the requisite fraction may possibly be picked up later.

The law, however, was exceedingly unpopular both in and out of the government. The ill-disguised opposition of influential members of the center, such as Vice-President of the Council Piccioni, caused the government to decide not to use such a mathematical subter-

JULY 15, 1953

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fuge to achieve its otherwise unattainable premium. In the absence of the 50.01 percent vote, the electoral law required the seats to be allocated by proportional representation, as in 1948. By this arrangement the center secured 303 out of 590 seats and won control of the Chamber of Deputies by a slim 16 votes.<sup>1</sup>

By a quirk of fate in the Senate the center secured a vote of 11,829,841, which gave them 50.2 percent, or 125, of the 247 seats that will compose the new body. The center controls the Senate by a margin of 14 votes, even smaller than in the Chamber.

As a result of the elections the position of the center has become definitely worse in both houses as compared with the 1948 elections. In 1948 the center secured 61.8 percent of the vote for the Chamber, losing 12.5 percent; in the Senate, it received 60.6 percent in 1948, losing 27.6 percent. In the Senate, nevertheless, its position is improved in one way. In 1948 there were 106 Senators "of right," appointed by the president for their services to the country, in general during the struggle against fascism. This group included a large number of Communists, and their votes had so frequently been added to the opposition that one of the objects of the Senate dissolution promulgated by President Einaudi on April 4 had been to get rid of Senators "of right." In the new Senate they will have only 6 seats.

<sup>1</sup> Included in the 16 are 3 seats for the South Tyrol People's party and the Valle d'Aosta group who also secured 1 seat. The loyalty of these to the center is doubtful.

The Christian Democrats emerged from the battle as the strongest party in Italy, for they received 10,959,554, or 40.08 percent, in the elections for the Chamber and 9,894,754, or 40.7 percent, for the Senate, thus improving their position as compared to the elections for the provincial councils of 1951-2, when they had secured 36.3 percent of the vote but had sustained a percentage loss from 1948. In that year they received 48.4 percent of a vote of 12,712,516 for the Chamber. In the new vote they have by far the largest number of seats, with 251 in the Chamber and 116 in the Senate. The party, however, is a congeries of so many discordant forces that the question now will be whether or not these forces can be held in line against the battery of opposition from the left and the right.

#### Minor Parties' Losses

One of the surprises and disappointments of the election were the severe losses sustained by the minor parties, for many people had hoped these parties, not tied to the Church as is the CD with its Catholic Action and Civic Committees, would attract anticlerical votes on the one side and on the other Socialists who can not accept the tie-up of Italy's Socialists with the Communists. In the Chamber the minor parties lost 4.14 percent as compared to the 1948 elections; for they have now received 9.26 percent instead of the 13.4 percent at that time. They have thus been reduced from 62 to 38 seats. In the Senate they control only 8 percent of the seats and have only 7 compared to their previous 19 seats.

The Social Democrats of Giuseppe Saragat and Giuseppe Romita now have 4.51 percent of the vote for the Chamber, or 19 seats, and 4.1 percent in the Senate; the Liberals, 3.14 percent in the Chamber and 3 percent in the Senate; while the Republicans are all but wiped out, with 1.61 percent in the Chamber and 0.9 percent in the Senate—so in the latter they secured no seats at all. This Republican cataclysm is particularly serious for De Gasperi, as two of his important cabinet members, Defense Minister Randolpho Pacciardi and Foreign Trade Minister Ugo la Malfa, were Republicans.

As had been expected, the extremes came off well in the election, but the right gained more than the left. The Monarchists, who had combined with the neo-Fascists in 1948 to get 4.8 percent of the votes, this time ran separately, as they had in the municipal elections of 1951-2. In those elections the Monarchists had received 3.6 percent and the neo-Fascists 6.3 percent, but now their positions are reversed. The Monarchists, with 7.1 for the Senate and 6.85 for the Chamber, have emerged in a far stronger position than any of the minor parties of the coalition and so have won the strategic role to which they aspired. The neo-Fascists, by contrast, have lost ground since the provincial elections of 1951-2; they received 6.1 percent for the Senate and 5.90 for the Chamber. The two groups between them will now have 69 seats instead of the 20 they previously had in the Chamber,

(Continued on page 8)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: J. BARTLET BRENNER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • MARGARET PARTON • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. JOHN W. NASON, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

*Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*



## Eisenhower's New Method

After Zachary Taylor became President, it infuriated him to discover that once his party colleagues in Congress had reached joint decisions about their attitudes on issues, they then voted to suit themselves when these issues came before them in the form of bills. General Taylor suffered from the fact that military experience does not necessarily prepare a man for the realities of the Presidency. The problem is not that a general who has entered public life inclines toward dictation—quite the contrary—but that his faith in the idea of *esprit de corps* makes him an easy victim of dictation by Congress.

Such a problem has faced President Dwight D. Eisenhower since he assumed the Presidency five months ago with the expectation that his colleagues in Congress would cooperate with him in pursuing the policies he espoused during his election campaign. Instead, they have pressed on him the adoption of policies and practices which his previous history suggests he would find repugnant. This harsh trial has had an effect on President Eisenhower different from its effect on President Taylor. The latter merely simmered in indignation. President Eisenhower has begun actively to experiment with a method for bringing Congress to terms. His success or failure in this experiment may determine the course of United States foreign policy in coming years.

The Eisenhower method became apparent during the speaking tour that took the President to Minneapolis, North and South Dakota, Dartmouth College, and the Theodore Roosevelt home at Oyster Bay, New York, from June 10 through 16.

In essence the method is simple. The President is marshaling public opinion behind him in support of his views on major issues, in the apparent hope that Congress will respond to public opinion. The President is a popular figure, but until recently he overlooked his popularity as a source of power he could use in dealing with Congress.

An important feature of President Eisenhower's method is its emphasis on sweet reasonableness. He is not marshaling opinion for an angry assault on Congress as a whole or on any individual member of Congress. "Government must not allow its policies to be caught in the fatal cross-fire of a Congress and an Executive warring upon one another," he said in an address to the Young Republican Federation at Mt. Rushmore, South Dakota, on June 11.

### Appeal to Public Opinion

In listing his policies the President joined the issue with many members of Congress, but he never named them.

Whereas Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican of Ohio, recently had suggested that the United States could keep the peace better by its own strength than in association with the United Nations, President Eisenhower observed that all "free nations must stand together, or they shall fall separately"; that the United States would be guilty of "dictation" if it tried to thrust all nations onto the path of action the United States alone favors; and that it would be wrong to try to make the United Nations over in the image of one nation alone.

At a time when Chairman Daniel

A. Reed of the House Ways and Means Committee was insisting that the excess profits tax be allowed to end, the President said that national security is the one issue that effectively rules all others," including the size of budgets and the rates and kinds of taxation. Speaking in a part of the country which still has many isolationists, the President criticized the idea of a "fortress America" and efforts to achieve security without the collaboration of other nations. When many nonisolationist Senators were protesting against the President's proposed reduction in the military—especially the Air Force—budget, he declared that it takes more than the "all-out military theory of defense" to deal with the kind of world crisis that confronts us at this time.

How effective is the President's combination of firmness and mildness? At Dartmouth College on June 14 the President urged the students not to "join the book-burners," who would "conceal evidence" by trying to suppress the fact, revealed in books, of the existence of Communist beliefs. "Don't be afraid to go to a library and read every book, so long as that document does not offend our own ideas of decency," he said. These and similar assertions raised two questions: Would the President end the State Department's practice of removing from its overseas libraries not only books written by Communists but also the works of non-Communists dealing with controversial topics like the Soviet Union and Communist China? Would the President go to the mat with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, whose ob-

(Continued on page 8)



## Should Peiping Be Admitted to the UN?

by Walter Illsley

Mr. Illsley, an engineer, has studied in Denmark and Mexico and at the School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. He went to China with UNRRA in 1946 and stayed on with the Shantan Bailie School until December 1952.

**I**F THE economic stability of a government, its general acceptance by its own people and its independence are tests of the admission of that government to the United Nations to represent the country it controls, then the Chinese Communists can pass these tests.

From my experience in Communist China, it seems reasonable to assume that the Communist government enjoys the support of the majority of the agricultural sector, or about 80 percent of the population. Among other sectors of the population—students, women, labor—the Communists also have evolved policies that appear to have been successful. Extensive government control of the press and radio do not cause widespread resentment, perhaps because for the most part there was little real freedom of the press in the past and to many people the present arrangement permitting “constructive” criticism of the government is a step forward, not backward.

Today corrupt or inefficient officials can and are publicly criticized, criticism being “constructive” if it seeks to improve but “destructive” if it opposes the government. Similarly, the vast “San Fan” group therapy movement against corruption, waste and bureaucracy that was carried out in the first half of 1952 with such ruthlessness that numbers of officials and businessmen in Shanghai and elsewhere committed suicide seems generally accepted, particularly now in retrospect, as having been a good thing for the country, even though it is recognized that there were cases of injustice. The predominant feel-

ing seems to be that corruption was such a serious social disease that strong medicine was required to save the country from this gangrene of previous governments.

Economically China appears to be making substantial progress, despite the Western blockade and the drain of the Korean war. The extensive flood control projects, particularly on the Huai River where some 2 million people are said to have been employed at one time, as well as more intensive cultivation, irrigation and land reclamation are reported to have substantially increased the supplies of food. Store windows are well stocked with most consumer goods, largely of Chinese manufacture. Some imported items such as films remain scarce and expensive. Gasoline, which had been rationed in Shanghai after the embargo by the West, was reduced in price and taken off ration in the summer of 1952. New imported automobiles apparently are available only to government institutions, but bicycles of both Chinese and foreign makes are plentiful.

### Russian Domination Doubted

It is on the basis of this kind of evidence, which owing to space limitations can be sketched only briefly here, that I believe the Chinese Communist government cannot be validly barred from admission to the UN on the grounds that it lacks popular support or is subject to economic instability. Suggestions that the Communist regime is dominated by the U.S.S.R. also are not borne out by anything I saw or heard.

During the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist forces I saw a large part of Peng Te-huai's army as I was traveling on foot up the same road they were taking in their march down into Szechuan. I saw no foreign military personnel, nor did I ever hear reports of any outside Port Arthur except on radio broadcasts emanating from Formosa.

After the U.S.S.R. and other countries established embassies in Peiping there were said to be the usual military attachés present. Later, with the arrival of Soviet aircraft and tanks, there must have been some accompanying technical instructors, but these were notably inconspicuous, particularly as compared with the previous American and British Army and Navy personnel who had always been familiar sights on the streets of Shanghai, especially in certain parts of the city.

There are a number of Soviet technicians in China, but they seem to be limited to key specialists well dispersed among various agricultural and industrial projects in the country. There is definitely nothing resembling the former UNRRA or ECA operations in China in which hundreds of foreigners were assembled in one organization, a large part of them engaged in administrative and managerial functions and conducting whole departments in a foreign language requiring the importation of foreign secretaries and filing systems. Much less can Soviet technicians be compared with any foreign personnel which formerly collected customs in every Chinese port.

(Continued on page 6)

by Robert Aura Smith

Mr. Smith, a member of the editorial board of *The New York Times*, has been with that newspaper since 1930 and spent many years in the Far East. He is the author of "The Rebirth of Formosa," an article which appeared in the FPA's *Headline Series* No. 99, "China and the World."

**I**T WOULD be rash to assert that Communist China should never be admitted to the United Nations. It is conceivable that at some time in the considerable future conditions will arise that would make Communist China's membership expedient. Those conditions do not exist now. On the contrary, other conditions prevail that would make the admission of the Chinese Communists now a complete stultification of the United Nations and all that it stands for.

Peiping and all the rest of the Communist and satellite world undoubtedly would regard Communist China's admission as a major political victory. Consequently, to agree to Peiping's admission as a part of the so-called "settlement" in respect to Korea would be tantamount to offering and giving a gigantic reward to aggression. What is more, the reward would be given by the very United Nations against which the aggression has been committed.

### No 'Shooting In'

This is even more serious than the paradox involved in the suggestion that a regime can shoot its way into an organization designed to keep the peace. It involves the whole concept of the condemnation of aggression and collective action to oppose it, upon which the United Nations must ultimately rise or fall. If aggression is rewarded now it is not merely condoned. It is, in effect, authorized as a legitimate course of action by the very body that has taken up arms to oppose it.

Much more than that, the whole idea of the character of United Na-

tions membership is involved. The Communists have never ceased to proclaim that UN membership is a "right." We cannot concur in that view. United Nations membership is an obligation assumed willingly by states that proclaim their desire to abide by the Charter. This fact should not be obscured, simply because some of the original members, the Communist group, have repeatedly violated this obligation.

The Chinese Communists in a series of aggressions, not only in Korea, have shown no sensitivity to the character of the Charter and have demonstrated no intention of abiding by it. Unless and until they do, their claim of admission by "right" is meretricious. The only reason for admitting them is the hope that they can contribute to the organization. They have, as yet, given no grounds upon which to base such a hope.

Much has been made of the argument that recognition of the Peiping regime and its admission, to the United Nations do not constitute "approval." Legally and technically this is correct, of course. But in the practical world the fact is that Peiping is intently resolved upon recognition and admission because such a course implies "de-recognition" and thus disapproval of the Nationalist Chinese on Formosa. The Communist military victory on the mainland has been won. The Communist political victory over the idea of a free China has not been won so long as the Nationalists survive on Formosa and so long as their spokesmen are heard and respected in world councils. This, naturally, is the real rea-

son for the Communists' determination to get into the United Nations, and not any desire to live up to the Charter which they have already so flagrantly violated.

There is still another Communist argument. It is stated that what Red China seeks is not really "admission" to the United Nations, since China is a charter member. What the Peiping regime wants, therefore, is the world-wide recognition of the claim that it "represents" the people of China and therefore should have the authorized voice on the Security Council. This, again, involves the converse idea that the Nationalist Government does not "represent" the people of China.

That the Communist regime represents military control of the mainland is beyond dispute. To suggest that this constitutes representing the people of China is quite another matter. It is impossible at this time, for an obvious reason, to determine if the Communists represent the Chinese people. The Chinese Communists, like all the other Communist regimes, have never dared to submit their rule to a free election. They have no mandate, and they dare not ask for one. Their claim to representation is, therefore, false from the outset. We simply do not know if Peiping represents China, and Peiping is obviously afraid to put the question to a valid test.

There is much talk about being "realistic" in approaching the Communists' control of China. What is needed is a little more genuine realism about the character of the regime and its objectives. The "realistic" thing to do, surely, would be to demand some evidence over a considerable period of time that Red China has abandoned its ideas of aggression and proposes to live peacefully in a world that wants peace. Until such

(Continued on page 6)

## Illsley

(Continued from page 4)

Thus, it is hard to make a case for either the military or civilian domination of Communist China by the Russians.

Domination by "remote control" is hard to substantiate in the eyes of the Chinese, who in any case traditionally consider their country *Chung Kuo*, "the central nation," numerically the most populous and historically the oldest uninterrupted culture in the world. They see the present revolution as begun by Sun Yat Sen quite independently of the Russian revolution. And they probably would say that the final victory was due to Marxist interpretations worked out by their own leaders.

In the universities I visited, English has been displaced by Chinese, not Russian; wherever it had been used in classrooms outside foreign language departments. Courses are offered in the Russian, English, Hindi, Arabic and many other languages, Russian and English being the most important. Foreign instructors are limited almost entirely to language departments. Throughout China pictures of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh far outnumber those of Stalin and Lenin. Being a veteran of Yenan or the Long March seems to rate higher than graduating from Moscow University. The terms of the Sino-Soviet trade agreements were set, not in rubles or JMP (Chinese currency), but in United States dollars.

These aspects of Chinese Communist rule do not lead me to believe that China is about to jump into the Titoist camp, but neither do I see valid reasons for opposing Communist China's admission to the United Nations on the ground that it is a "victim of foreign domination."

## Smith

(Continued from page 5)

evidence appears, the realistic thing must be to do some watchful waiting. Neither the world nor Asia nor the United Nations is coming to an untimely end week after next if Mao Tse-tung and his fellow puppets don't get their sounding board in the United Nations. What's all the hurry?



### FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

## 'A Tide in the Affairs of Men'

The week of June 15, 1953 will probably be marked down by future historians as one of those peak moments in human affairs when, by a strange quirk of circumstances, the two superpowers of the mid-twentieth century—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—simultaneously faced the maximum opportunities for peaceful victory and the maximum risks of enlarged war.

On the same day, June 17, when riots in East Germany were welcomed in the West as a "crack in the Kremlin wall," it became known that Dr. Syngman Rhee, president of the Republic of Korea, had permitted the release of North Korean prisoners without consulting the United Nations Command, under whose orders South Korean forces have been operating since the outbreak of war in 1950, thereby imperiling the truce, which Washington believed was then close to consummation. For the first

time since the end of World War II, which had left Europe and Asia prostrate and disorganized, the U.S.S.R. was openly defied in Eastern Europe and the United States in Asia.

These two developments will clearly have far-reaching repercussions, the most important of which in the immediate future is the reassertion of independence—in Germany by a vanquished people, in South Korea by a people which regards the truce approved by the United Nations as tantamount to defeat. The correlation of forces in the postwar years—between victors and vanquished, between the great powers and the small—is thus undergoing a profound transformation which will require fundamental revisions in the foreign policies of both Washington and Moscow.

On the face of it both the riots in East Germany and the defiance of Dr. Rhee can be regarded as rebel-

lions against communism. Since the United States has proclaimed communism, whether Russian or Chinese, to be international public enemy No. 1, Dr. Rhee and, in sympathy with him, Chiang Kai-shek's spokesmen on Formosa may well ask why Washington salutes the actions of the East German rioters yet deplores and criticizes South Korea's resistance to the truce. Both the East Germans and the South Koreans, moreover, are struggling to achieve the unification of their respective countries, divided as a result of World War II.

What is the difference between the two situations, which have come to a boil at the same moment? First of all, American troops are in South Korea, and the failure of the truce would imperil their security, as Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, hitherto a supporter of Rhee and Chiang, pointed out

in the Senate. But disturbances in Germany might also imperil American troops in Europe.

Second, the United States can properly point out that it has expended thousands of lives, as well as money and matériel, to protect South Korea from aggression—as contrasted with the actions of the U.S.S.R., which has depleted the resources of East Germany and sharply reduced its living standards—and therefore deserves the support and confidence of the Rhee government. A third, and more controversial, aspect is that the East Germans, presumably, are rebelling against the Soviet occupation authorities and the East German Communist regime in the name of freedom and democracy, whereas the impression is gaining ground in the United States that Dr. Rhee, indubitably a patriot, is also a man of authoritarian temper, prepared to go to any lengths, including a general war, to establish his rule over all of Korea.

### Risks and Opportunities

For Moscow these developments present great risks but also great opportunities. There are many indications that, following Stalin's death, the Malenkov-Molotov-Beria triumvirate had undertaken to taper off, perhaps actually liquidate, its rule over East Germany, which had created an untenable situation for a relatively backward nation trying to administer one of the most industrially advanced peoples in the world. The mortal risk of any dictatorship is that the moment it seeks to relax its controls the first result may be an explosion. This is what happened in East Germany, and similar developments may follow in Eastern Europe.

If the Soviet government now clamps down repressions again, its "peace offensive" would be discredit-

ed and its security outside Russia's own borders gravely endangered. If, however, as indicated by reports of June 20, the Soviet authorities persist in their new policy of lifting restrictions, they may win a great diplomatic victory. For now the desire for German unification, which had long been incautiously disbelieved in Washington, has violently burst into the open, and it is highly doubtful that it can be set aside by either Russia or the West.

### Germany and Korea

Should German unification take place in the near future, the Communist regime of East Germany will be discredited, perhaps ousted; but the position of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, champion of Bonn's integration with the West, may also be jeopardized. The chief political beneficiary of unification will be the Social Democratic party; and it is significant that all reports from East Germany credit underground workers' organizations with the activities that brought about the riots. It may also prove significant that, as reported by *The New York Times* on June 20, "not one of a half dozen reporters who circulated among the rioters in East Berlin could affirm on being questioned that they heard the demonstrators utter a single slogan on behalf of the West German Republic, a West German politician or party and a Western ally."

If the United States is to benefit by the fast-moving trend toward German unification, it will have to display far more understanding of the policies of the Social Democrats than it has done since the end of World War II. The German nation has suffered in the past from the fact that it had never carried out the kind of genuine revolution which forged democracy in Britain, France and the United States. In 1919 the United

States and Britain, and in 1945 the United States, did a great deal to discourage a social revolution in defeated Germany for fear that it might redound to the advantage of the Communists. Now the opportunity presents itself once more for the German people, through rejection of both fascism and communism, to develop genuine democracy. If the United States, through fear of socialism, opposes this trend, we may lose the support of a united Germany.

In South Korea Dr. Rhee's defiance of the United Nations has given the Chinese and North Korean Communists an opportunity to ask a question which is also asked here: Would the UN Command, in case of a truce, be able to control the South Korean government? The United States, the leading participant in the UN collective security effort, must now find an answer to this question and discover some way by which the struggle against aggression and communism will not result in the reinforcement of an admittedly anti-Communist, but not necessarily pro-democratic, regime bent on war to the bitter end.

Both in Germany and in Korea the United States faces great tests of our capacity to understand the problems of peoples whose traditions, policies and aspirations are in many respects different from our own. As Shakespeare eloquently said in *Julius Caesar*:

"There is a tide in the affairs of men,  
Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune . . .  
On such a full sea are we now afloat;  
And we must take the current when it serves,  
Or lose our venture."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## Carey

(Continued from page 2)

and in the Senate they have jumped from 4 to 25.

While the left has gained, it has not profited as much as the right. In the face of a herculean effort against them, the Communists and the left-wing Socialists of Pietro Nenni, running jointly, had a vote of 9,136,637, or 20.3 percent, and the Socialists for the Chamber, whereas today the Communists running separately won 6,122,638 votes, or 22.70 percent, for the Chamber and 5,080,143, or 20.9 percent, for the Senate. The Nenni Socialists trailed them with 3,440,220, or 12.70 percent, for the Chamber and 2,929,926, or 12.1 percent, for the Senate. Although it is not possible to compare their relative positions because of their joint ballots in 1948, it is possible to make the comparison, insofar as it is indicative, for the provincial elections of 1951-2. In those elections the Communists secured a vote of 4,495,681, or 20.3 percent, with the Socialists 2,892,811, or 13.1 percent. There can be no denying that the Communists' position has improved, but their gain has not been startling. Rather it represents a gradual growth.

The center thus holds a precarious balance in Italy. If, as reported, some

of the CD's are determined to go ahead more rapidly than in the past with their programs for social and land reform and if the United States is not so unwise as to curtail its assistance at this critical juncture, all may not yet be lost for Italian democracy. But the immediate political outlook is ominous.

(Mrs. Carey, assistant professor of government at Barnard College and expert consultant, Office of Military Government in Germany, during the summer of 1948, is at present living in Rome.)

## Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

jection to such books caused the State Department to adopt its removal policy? These questions were soon answered. At a press conference on June 19 the President reminded correspondents that he did not deal in personalities (McCarthy), and said that he was not familiar with the precise contents of the State Department's book-removal order.

Is this seeming retreat from the issue a surrender like that of Zachary Taylor? Or is it an integral part of the President's application of his method for dealing with Congress? Perhaps the latter interpretation will prove correct. The creation of both an era of good feeling and an era of

accomplishment takes time, if it can ever be achieved. It would be unreasonable to expect that a massively forceful public opinion will take form at once and cause a quick change of attitude on the part of members of Congress who stand between the President and his attainment of the goals he outlined on his June tour. Many great military achievements have been preceded by a series of shorter advances and brief withdrawals. This is one aspect of military experience that may be applicable to political conflict. A few months of experiment will tell the tale.

That public opinion is being aroused on some of the controversial issues discussed by the President is indicated by the manifesto, "The Freedom to Read," which the American Library Association, acting in concert with the American Book Publishers' Council, promulgated on June 25. In a separate resolution dealing specifically with the recent "purge" of United States Information Service libraries overseas, the American Library Association criticized the State Department's handling of the situation and threatened to end its participation in the foreign program if full literary freedom were not restored.

BLAIR BOLLES

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

### In this issue:

Italian Voters Want Change—J. P. C. Carey..... 1

Eisenhower's New Method—B. Bolles..... 3

Should Peiping Be Admitted to the UN?

W. Illsley..... 4

R. A. Smith..... 5

'A Tide in the Affairs of Men'—V. M. Dean..... 6

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—

U.S. Policy in Middle East

by Georgiana G. Stevens

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL STUDIES  
CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY  
10900 EUCLID AVE.  
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO

LS-11

xxii:21, 7.15.53